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Policy recommendations
\ Continue legal and psychological ad-
visory services for the displaced and 
strengthen local ownership
DC must combine educational efforts in the municipal-
ities and in the education and health sectors as well as 
the reduction of financial and bureaucratic hurdles. 
Measures to support both local ombudsperson offices 
and victims’ and migrant associations also strengthen 
local ownership. 
\ Promote start-up programmes
By providing advice on the formalization of micro- 
enterprises in start-up programmes, DC can enable the 
beneficiaries to advance to the formal sector. In this 
respect, the contributors should generally expand 
measures to cover all particularly vulnerable parts  
(Colombian, Ecuadorian and Venezuelan) of the 
population. 
\ Support a regionally co-ordinated  
approach
The regional scale of forced displacement requires a  
regionally co-ordinated and long-term humanitarian 
and developmental approach that takes into account 
Colombian and Venezuelan displaced persons (DPs) 
equally. DC can contribute to this by providing expert 
advice to the responsible ministries and supporting re-
gional initiatives such as the Cartagena Process.
\ Support transnational, cross-sector  
programmes in the northern border area
Structural marginalization of the Colombian–Ecuado-
rian border area offers a breeding ground for violent 
Colombian conflicts to spill over into Ecuadorian terri-
tory.  With the help of cross-sector and cross-border 
programmes, actors in development cooperation (DC) 
should play a part in the long-term containment of the 
drugs economy and the resulting displacements. An  
integral and participative bottom-up approach should 
promote the development of government infrastruc-
ture, especially in justice, education, health and jobs.
\ Address the cleavages within the  
Colombian exiles 
Building trust and establishing reconciliation are signif-
icant requirements for peace and (re)integration pro-
cesses. They must be incorporated into programmes in 
Ecuador for a traumatized Colombian exile community, 
which includes victims as well as perpetrators. DC can 
support agencies that provide social work, public edu-
cation institutions, and church-run institutions that 
enjoy confidence and authority in the region in 
particular. 
Protection, reconciliation and 
access to rights for DPs in Ecuador
Requirements for the integration of displaced persons (DPs) 
from Colombia and Venezuela in Ecuador
Clara Schmitz-Pranghe \ BICC
PROTECTION, RECONCILIATION AND ACCESS TO RIGHTS FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN ECUADOR  \ C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE
2 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 9 \ 2018
The continuing displacement within and from Co-
lombia, along with the exodus of large parts of the 
Venezuelan population, represent an enormous hu-
manitarian and political challenge for the region, and 
especially for Ecuador, which is one of the most im-
portant host countries for displaced persons (DPs). In 
light of the lack of prospects for a comprehensive and 
speedy return of DPs to their home countries, DC can 
and should use mid- and long-term programmes to 
contribute to preventing further displacement and to 
the integration process for DPs.1
Forced displacement from Venezuela 
and Colombia and the context of  
hosting DPs in Ecuador
Since 2015, 1.6 million people have left Venezuela due 
to food shortages, collapsing health services, state  
repression, the violence of paramilitary groups  
(colectivos) and escalating criminality. The General 
Secretary of the Organization of American States  
recently described the situation there as “a humani-
tarian crisis on an unprecedented scale in the western 
hemisphere” (Almagro, 2017). Several thousand Vene-
zuelans reach Ecuador every day. In the period from 
January to the end of May 2018 alone, the number 
reached 340,000 (UNHCR, 2018). According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), about half of those entered for reasons that 
qualify them as refugees. However, Ecuador views 
Venezuelans entering the country as migrant workers 
and economic migrants and thus does not grant 
them refugee protection. Of the Venezuelans in Ecua-
dor, 45 per cent have no regular migration status, and 
25 per cent only have temporary tourist visas. Due to  
a lack of documents or financial means, they are fre-
quently not in a position to fulfil visa conditions.   
At approximately US $250, the cost of the required 
UNASUR visa is about five times higher than the 
MERCOSUR visa which is available to Colombian mi-
grants. This means that Venezuelans in Ecuador are 
dealing with particularly precarious residency and 
living conditions.
1 \ This Policy Brief is based on the findings of research which was carried 
out in Ecuador in spring of 2018 as part of the BMZ-funded project 
“Protected rather than protracted – Strengthening refugees and peace”.
Refugee movements from Colombia to Ecuador are 
also continuing.  In November 2016, the Colombian 
Government and FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion-
arias de Colombia) signed a peace treaty which also 
stipulated the demobilization of FARC.  However, in 
the areas from which FARC has withdrawn, the  
guerrilla organization, ELN (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional) and new criminal and violent actors are 
pushing in.  Although some indicators of violence 
from Colombia—such as the number of anti-personnel 
mines and kidnappings or deaths in the Colombian 
army—suggest that these numbers are falling, the 
number of murders, especially of human rights activ-
ists and political activists rose by 45 per cent in 2017 
compared to 2016 (INDEPAZ, 2018). 
According to the UNHCR, several hundred Colombians 
still seek shelter in Ecuador every month.  In 2017,  
applications for asylum in Ecuador by Colombian  
citizens increased by 23 per cent.  Significant reasons 
for fleeing from Colombia is fighting between com-
peting armed actors like the Colombian Army, FARC, 
ELN, paramilitary groups and criminal actors as well 
as direct attacks, protection money extortion and  
recruitment by armed groups.  Of 47,416 recognized 
refugees in Ecuador in 2018, 70 per cent were of  
Colombian origin (UNHCR, 2018).  In total, the number 
of Colombians living in Ecuador is estimated at more 
than 500,000, of whom around 300,000 are not in pos-
session of regular residency status (Ministerio de  
Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana, 2018).  
The individual migration status only offers limited 
information on the causes and motivations for entry 
to Ecuador, as a large proportion of Colombians in  
Ecuador are still in the middle of the asylum process, 
have visas, or are in the country illegally.  Especially 
since the introduction of the US dollar as the sole  
currency in Ecuador in 2000, work migration from  
Colombia and Venezuela has played a role.
Against the backdrop of continuing violence, a return 
to Colombia is currently not an option for the majority 
of refugees. Also, given the 7.7 million internally dis-
placed persons at the time of writing, the Colombian 
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government is not giving much attention to the  
return and reintegration of international refugees; 
access to reparations in accordance with the Colom-
bian Victim Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de 
Tierras) of 2011 continues to be limited. 
However, local integration in Ecuador also has its 
challenges: The majority of the Colombian and Vene-
zuelan refugees have only very limited access to the 
jobs and housing markets or land, even though Ecuador 
has a relatively liberal refugee policy which was set 
down in the constitution adopted in 2008 and the law 
on human mobility that was passed in 2017.  Ecuador 
embedded the principle of universal citizenship in its 
constitution and grants people the same rights as  
Ecuadorian citizens, irrespective of their migration 
status (personas en condición de movilidad humana). Refu-
gees who exercise those rights, however, are frequently 
faced with bureaucratic hurdles (e.g. in connection 
with the extension of residence permits) and dis-
crimination from employers, landlords and staff in 
local authorities and the education and health sectors. 
The pressure on the strained job market in Ecuador is 
also accompanied by the danger of creating competi-
tion between Ecuadorians and displaced persons (DPs).
Moreover, the escalation of violence in the Colombian 
provinces of Nariño and Putumayo has a direct im-
pact on the security situation of Ecuador’s northern 
border region. This is particularly the case for Colom-
bians living there, who are at an increased risk of  
being displaced again or who face recruitment by 
armed groups such as the ELN and criminal groups.
In the winter and spring of 2018, kidnappings, murders 
of civilians and direct attacks by transnationally  
operating criminal actors on the Ecuadorian security 
forces and on infrastructure fuelled fears among the 
population.  This led the Ecuadorian Government to 
take massive military actions and most recently to 
appoint the Esmeraldas task force (Fuerza de Tarea 
Conjunta), which is made up of 1,800 soldiers. Armed 
clashes between transnationally operating criminal 
groups and Ecuadorian security forces also led to dis-
placements and evacuations on Ecuadorian soil.
Necessity for cross-sector and trans-
nationally located measures in the 
northern border region 
The changing and diversifying constellation of actors 
in the Colombian–Ecuadorian border area, where new 
criminal groups and the ELN are establishing them-
selves, is increasingly unpredictable for both the local 
population and for aid organizations. 
The approach of the Colombian and Ecuadorian gov-
ernments is primarily a military one and puts civil-
ians at risk of getting caught in the middle and— 
under suspicion of collaborating with the military—
falling victim to intimidation and threats by armed 
groups. 
The specific threat by armed groups and the feeling of 
insecurity, which some Colomgians are still being 
subjected to even in exile, impedes their efforts to  
integrate. In some cases, the (perceived) insecurity 
forms the basis for the decision of refugees to leave 
the border area and move further inland, where they 
once again have to try to settle down.  Since the turn 
of the millennium, Plan Colombia2  has triggered  
 
2 \ Plan Colombia was a strategy initiated by the then-Colombian Presi-
dent Andrés Pastrana in 1999, which received huge financial support 
from the United States in particular, and aimed to end the civil war 
and reduce the area in which drugs were cultivated. 
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Reconciliation and social cohesion are, however,  
essential prerequisites for the peace and reintegration 
process in Columbia and the integration process in 
Ecuador.  The inadequate system of criminal prosecu-
tion in Colombia and Ecuador as well as the resulting 
deeply held mistrust of the Colombian authorities 
and among the displaced Colombians themselves 
poses a major hurdle for the self-organization of exiled 
Colombians in Ecuador.  The fact that the Colombian 
exile community is far less organized compared to 
the Venezuelan community also has an impact on 
their political participation and representation, as 
well as their demand for rights.  Support comes mainly 
from within the family or from neighbours.  Access to 
Colombian law also continues to be denied for many 
refugees:  Some Colombians in Ecuador, for instance, 
do not participate in elections in their country of ori-
gin as they shy away from going to the consulate.
Also, many Colombians refuse to register officially as 
“victims” in line with Colombia’s victim law, as this 
forces them to name the perpetrators whom they  
continue to fear in exile.  Following threats from un-
known individuals, the branch of the international  
forum for victims (Foro Internacional de Víctimas) in 
Ecuador, an organization which represents the inter-
ests of victims of the Colombian conflict living abroad, 
have had to stop their work for the time being. .
In this climate of mistrust and fear, the Catholic 
Church in particular enjoys a high degree of trust and 
is also present in inaccessible border areas.  This means 
it is ideally placed to get involved in trust-building 
and reconciliation.  With the help of local partners, 
DC can also support schools and social work to incor-
porate reconciliation within the Colombian exile 
community and peace education into teaching plans 
and programmes.
Access to rights
Access to housing employment, education and land is 
severely hampered despite the constitutional legal 
equality of immigrants, no matter what their status.  
On the one hand, there is a lack of knowledge within 
massive refugee movements from Colombia. In the 
context of these experiences, humanitarian and de-
velopment actors—in dialogue with the Colombian 
and Ecuadorian governments—must play a more ac-
tive role in ensuring that protecting inhabitants and 
preventing new or repeated displacements is given 
precedence in every action taken by the security forces. 
At the same time, in supporting cross-sector, human 
rights-based programmes on the periphery, which 
has always been marginalized, DC can contribute to 
combatting the conflict’s structural conditions—such 
as the lack of state infrastructure in the areas of jus-
tice, education, health and jobs—by developing insti-
tutions. Moreover, measures should not be limited to 
San Lorenzo (Esmeraldas)—the current focus of the 
military.  Instead, they should also be implemented in 
the border areas of the Carchi und Sucumbíos prov-
inces, which are equally important smuggling routes 
and spheres of influence of armed groups. 
In the face of the high mobility in the border region 
and similar challenges that are relevant for develop-
ment policies, a transnational approach is essential 
and must include the Nariño und Putumayo provinces 
on the Colombian side. In this context, DC should 
provide back-up for measures that improve access to 
rights and basic care in the areas of education, health, 
jobs and the law. These measures should support  
social work with young people to prevent their recruit-
ment by criminal and guerrilla groups. A detailed 
conflict assessment is particularly important in this 
respect to guarantee conflict sensitivity in an envi-
ronment marked by competing violent actors and il-
legal economies.
Building trust as a prerequisite for the 
integration process
Fundamental structural socio-economic inequality, 
the historically deep-rooted conflict between liberal 
and conservative political tendencies, and the contin-
uing violent conflict—which has been ongoing for 
more than 50 years—have led to a division among the 
Colombian population, even in Ecuador.
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for a long time.  In turn, companies and landlords of-
ten disallowed the refugee passport as a legal docu-
ment.  The recent introduction of a new identification 
document for refugees, which is identical to that of 
an Ecuadorian citizen, is an important and appropri-
ate process. However, it is slow to gain ground, above 
all because up to now, refugees can only apply for this 
document in three of Ecuador’s towns (Quito, Guay-
aquil, Cuenca).  Providing support to the Vice-Ministry 
for Human Mobility and the civil register in data entry 
and processing could contribute to these processes 
being accelerated and, using mobile registration,  
promote applications for identification documents in 
rural regions as well
Access to income
A large proportion of the Colombians and Venezuelans 
living in Ecuador work under precarious conditions 
in the informal economy.  In towns, they work above 
all as street traders, in the country as day workers in 
agriculture or illegal gold mines.  Mainly to better 
protect displaced persons (DPs) from police repres-
sion and conflicts with competing traders for public 
spaces, programmes that provide seed capital for 
starting up a business—which until now have pri-
marily been aimed at Colombian DPs—should gener-
ally contain an advisory element about registering as 
a small business. These should feed into, for example, 
the UNHCR graduation programme carried out by 
HIAS (which centres around working with a personal 
mentor), or Caritas’ seed capital programme. In this 
context, it makes sense not to restrict measures funded 
by DC to Colombian displaced, but to expand them to 
parts of the vulnerable Ecuadorian and Venezuelan 
populations particularly in need of protection.  Sup-
porting the local processing industry and its distribu-
tion in rural areas in collaboration with the munici-
palities—e.g. with the help of GIZ—presents an 
important addition in this regard. 
local authorities and in the health and education sys-
tem when it comes to the rights of refugees.  On the 
other, discrimination against Colombians and Vene-
zuelans is widespread in parts of Ecuadorian society. 
Against this backdrop, DC and humanitarian actors 
should continue to offer legal advice to refugees 
through local and international aid organizations 
while establishing local ownership for advisory proj-
ects.  Targeted training measures, for instance, could 
strengthen the ability of local ombudsperson offices 
(defensorías públicas) and social organizations (e.g. 
migrant and victim associations) to demand rights 
for refugees more actively. 
Additionally, with the help of local partners who are 
already active in the area of legal advice, DC can become 
involved in anti-discrimination efforts.  Measures 
could be taken to raise awareness at different levels: 
At the institutional level of local and provincial gov-
ernment; in the health and education systems; at 
employment agencies and companies.  Aspects to be 
covered should include the rights of refugees, the causes 
of forced displacement and migration movements, 
the special need of refugees for protection, and the 
benefits of integrating refugees locally for the entire 
society. To this end, the use of integrated experts, for 
example in Ecuador’s health, education and labour 
ministries as well as in unions and employer associa-
tions would be appropriate. 
Besides discrimination and a lack of awareness,  
bureaucratic hurdles also play a role when it comes 
to integration into the employment market and the 
social systems. Having your protection status con-
firmed every three months and the associated travel 
costs and costs arising from being off work represents 
a significant financial burden for many Colombians 
and Venezuelans.  Often, this is a reason for not ex-
tending their status.  Moreover, as a result of the for-
mal differences between the Ecuadorian ID and the 
refugee passport, the authorities did not consider 
themselves able to record refugees in their systems 
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people being forced to flee their homes into considera-
tion.  Such a process could tie in with a long-standing 
tradition of regional solution strategies in Latin 
America. 
Mention can be made here, for example, of the Carta-
gena Process initiated in 1984, the subsequent decla-
rations of San José (1994), Mexico (2004) and Brazil 
(2014), as well as the International Conference on 
Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) of 1989. Ecua-
dor, which is in discussions with Colombia as part of 
the Andean Community (CAN) and at times has had a 
close political relationship with Venezuela, could take 
a leading role in designing the content of such a 
conference.3
As an appropriate reaction to the scale of the current 
(forced) migration from Venezuela and the particularly 
precarious situation of many Venezuelans abroad, DC 
should generally integrate the Venezuelan exile com-
munity into the design of new programmes in forced 
displacement and migration and support the socio- 
economic integration process of Venezuelans at an 
early stage.  Humanitarian measures—such as the 
provision of initial housing, food and support for 
starting businesses—must be expanded to the dis-
placed Venezuelans regardless of their immigration 
status. 
3 \ The Ecuadorian Foreign Office is already taking the initia-
tive and has issued invitations for a conference on displaced 
Venezuelans to take place in September 2018 in Quito.
The regional dimension of forced  
displacement from Venezuela
Forced displacement and migration from Colombia 
and Venezuela have a regional dimension.  In particu-
lar, the current exodus from Venezuela presents the 
host countries in the region (above all Colombia,  
Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil) with chal-
lenges that can barely be handled unilaterally. 
Political reactions to Venezuelan immigration in the 
countries of the region are, however, very different:  
While some countries grant asylum to Venezuelans 
based on the broad definition of a refugee contained in 
the Cartagena Declaration adopted in 1984 while other 
countries, such as Ecuador, do not. Neighbouring Peru to 
the south will continue to issue temporary residence 
permits for Venezuelans until mid-2019.  However, as 
this is only a temporary measure, the long-term effects 
cannot be predicted, especially for Ecuador.  Up to now, 
Ecuador has been a transit county on the way south for 
large parts of the Venezuelan migrant groups, but even 
now pressure on the Ecuadorian jobs market is rising.  
Xenophobia and competition, for example among street 
traders for public spaces, could increase.
It will only be possible to find appropriate answers to 
Venezuela’s humanitarian and political crisis at a  
regional level and in dialogue between the Venezuelan 
government and host countries.  DC should, therefore, 
encourage a comprehensive regional discussion and the 
development of a regionally coordinated approach.  In 
these discussions, the question of granting asylum for 
Venezuelans should also be addressed, as should multi-
lateral negotiations with the Venezuelan government 
that aim to ensure that it accepts responsibility for the 
causes of the exodus of its population. To this end, the 
use of integrated experts in the responsible ministries 
would make sense.  Specifically, the preparation for a re-
gional conference on the topic of forced migration could 
form the focus of such consultations, which take Colom-
bian and Venezuelan displacement and processes of 
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